


# 13. MANAGING IDENTITY & AUTHENTICATION

CORE - Management, administration & Implementation aspects of GRANTING or RESTRICTING access to ASSETS.

PERSPECTIVE


Types of Access Controls

- L Preventive
- L Detective
- L Corrective




Four Primary Access Control Elements

- L Identification
- L Authentication
- L Authorization
- L Accounting



Authentication Factors  
Type - I, II, III




# \* Types of Access Control

## Preventive Access Controls



CCTV



Fence

IPS +  
Firewalls

Antivirus  
software

Security  
policies

Security awareness &  
Training

## Defective Access controls



motion  
detectors




Security  
guard

Job  
Rotation  
+  
Mandatory  
Vacation

IDS + HoneyPots

## Corrective Access controls

viruses



modifies the  
environment to  
return system to normal  
after unauthorized activity or  
security incident such as

\* other controls

sign board / warnings


Defensive → Discourage


→ It's different from corrective control as this is on about - Repair and Restore  
Recovery → backup & restore

Deterrent → Enforce security policy (compliance) | DETOUR SIGN



Compensating → Alternate

### CONTRA CATEGORY






No Authorization




Logging user actions based on their proven identities provides



# \* Authentication Factors



# \* other factors



## Two-step Authentication

### HOTP

Hash-based one time password - value remains till used

↳ Net bank code

### TOTP

Time OTP - code expires such as 30-seconds

NOTE - what if OTP displayed on mobile as pop-up notification. How is that secure. Check NIST 800-63B

# Biometrics

Type 2 Error

**FAR**

(False Acceptance Rate)

- Invalid subject is authenticated

- False positive

wrong key is positive

or false positive is when invalid subject is authenticated

Type I Error

**FRR**

(False Rejection Rate)

- Valid subject is not authenticated

- False Negative

right key is negative

or false negative is when valid subject is not authenticated

**CER**

(Crossover Error Rate)

To determine the quality of Biometric system

False ~~neg~~ positive is better than False negative.

Biometric Device Sensitivity

**High**

- FRR increases  
- More false negatives

**Low**

- FAR increases  
- More False positives

↑ FRR

→


Prim for support

↑ FAR



→

Not good for security

# Methods for Device Authentication



## \* IAM Implementation



## Password Storage

Passwords are never stored in plaintext. Instead, system creates hash for password using hashing algorithm like SHA-3. For some password, it creates some hash number. when user authenticates, system hashes the supplied password & matches with stored password hash, if it's same, system authenticates user.

Provides  
"C"  
+  
"I"

# KERBEROS

→ Primary purpose = Authentication


— deserves a video

↳ For SSO

p.f.o End for program

## kerberos logon process

1



dave  
\*\*\*\*\*


User types username & password into the client

2



dave

+ AES



KDC

client encrypts the username with AES & send to KDC

in clients & servers are maintained in KDC

**Key distribution centre** - trusted 3rd party that provides authentication service using symmetric cryptography

3


KDC



KDC verifies username against database of known credentials

4

KDC



Encrypts with hash of user password

\*\*\*\*\*  
Dave's password

TGT

KDC generates symmetric key & encrypts with user password. KDC also generates time-stamped TGT (proof that subject is authenticated in KDC)

5 KDC transmits encrypted symmetric key & TGT to client.

6 client installs TGT for use until expires.


client decrypts symmetric key with user's password.

Note - Security is user password is never transmitted - the symmetric key will ~~encrypt~~ & decrypt if user knows the password

when client want to access object


1 client sends TGT to KDC with request to access resource (print)

2 KDC verifies TGT is valid & checks client has sufficient privilege to print the document.




KDC generates service ticket & send to client.

4



5

Server verifies the validity of ticket with KDC



6

Kerberos activity is completed when identity & authorization is verified.

7

Session opens b/w client & server for a print job.

Note - Kerberos take care of CIA but need time-synchronised within 5 minute of each other.

Kerberos problem

- KDC = single point of failure
- KDC down = No Subject Authentication
- require time synchronization

# AAA Protocols

RADIUS → not for SSO

- Remote Authentication Dialin User Service
- Uses UDP and encrypts only the exchange of passwords
- Doesn't encrypt the entire session

TACACS

- Terminal Access controller Access-control system

- TACACS+
  - ↳ Encrypts only the authentication information

↳ ~~UDP port 49~~

- TACACS+
  - ↳ TCP 49 (Reliability)

(improvements)

Diameter

- TCP port 3868
- Supports IPSec & TLS

RADIUS → Centralizes authentication for remote connections

TACACS+ → Separates Authentication, Authorization & Accounting into separate processes

Diameter → supports traditional IP, mobile IP, VoIP

# End P.1.0 Revised concepts from All-in-one Federated Identity Management & SSO

A common language to communicate with different federation organizations.

**SAML** — Security Assertion Markup Language  
Exchange Authentication & Authorization (AA) information b/w federation organizations.  
For SSO

**SPML** — Service provisioning Markup Language  
Exchanges user information for federated identity SSO purpose.  
Allows platform to generate & respond to provisioning requests.

**XACML** — Extensible Access Control Markup Language  
governing policies as attribute-based access-control system + also uses RBAC.  
for s/w defined n/w apps

**OAuth 2.0** — Open Authorization  
Signup to canvas using Twitter credentials. — P.1.0

OpenID — Decentralized Authentication

↳ User can login to multiple unrelated websites with one set of credentials maintained by 3<sup>rd</sup> party

OpenID Connect — Authentication layer using OAuth 2.0 framework

↳ Use of JSON (JavaScript Object Notation) + JWT (JSON web token)

OAuth + OpenID } — For web based apps to share authentication info. without sharing credentials.


OAuth — Allows access to resources from another service

OpenID — Allows to use account from another service with user application

Kerberos + LDAP — In-house services

LDAP — p.f.o — End xx

# RADIUS Architecture



Kerberos  
ADFS  
Central Authentication Service (CAS) } ✓ SSO

RADIUS x SSO

**Biometric Errors**

- Type I** - Valid subject is not authenticated (Pointing to a red arrow labeled "Pointing Summary")
- Type II** - Invalid subject is incorrectly authenticated as a valid user

# TOKENS

## Synchronous Dynamic Password Tokens

time based passwords that expires in 30/60 seconds.

## Asymmetric Dynamic Password Tokens

- uses algorithm / counter where password / code is active until it used

## Biometric Ultimate Summary

### Type I — FRR — False Rejection Rate

↳ valid subject not authenticated

↳ False negative

↳ high sensitivity = more FRR / false negatives

### Type II — FAR — False Acceptance Rate

↳ Invalid subject authenticated

↳ False positive

↳ ~~High~~ Low sensitivity = more FAR / false positives




- low CER = Accurate Biometric System

- False Negative is better than False Positive

# Kerberos From Luke A.

(open source)  
It's software  
1 kind of 2nd party authentication service



CONFUSED?  
YOU SHOULD BE.  
REFER TO OBSESSION NOTES.

④ Message 1: - TGS  
+  
service request (Unencrypted message (Request: SQL Access to file server))  
+  
Message 2: TGT. Encrypted with ~~TGS~~ session key

1. TGT is used to communicate TGS. TGS send service ticket to client to access the resource.
2. TGT has TGS session key. only TGS can decrypt TGT.
3. KDC (AS + KMS) generates session specific key that can be decrypt with user's password for short, AS + KMS & user, all three know session key

# Perspective

**KDC**

- KDC vouches for individual's identities using tickets.

**CA**

- CA vouches for individual's identities using digital certificates.

Attacks

Dictionary

- all possible common password / words, with possible combinations

Brute-Force

- all possible key values

Rainbow table

- when attackers already has hash of the password

Storage device



User 1: read, write

User 2: read

User 3: read, write, delete

What type of Access control is used?

Resource-based Access control


- X RBAC
- X MAC
- X RRBAC

Matches permission to resource like a storage volume. They are common in cloud-based infra.

# SPML - Service Provisioning Markup Language

**Core purpose** → SPML helps to ease of user account mgmt (acc creation, modification, deletion) in complex environment


↓  
 Designed to allow platforms to generate and respond to provisioning requests.



Note - SPML is designed for exchanging user information for federated identity SSO purpose.

# SAML - Security Assertion Markup Language

(security concerns - P.T.O)



**Note** - SAML exchanges Authentication & Authorization information plus federate identities

**Note** - SP & IDP already established trust using PKI (X.509) before SAML.

**Note** - Identity Provider is a single point of failure. Think Backup Authentication.

## \* SAML Security Concerns / Precautions

- ↳ Use TLS to secure SAML token
- ↳ XML schema validation (only downloaded from trusted ISP)
- ↳ verify & validate certificate of IdP
- ↳ Secure connection (IPsec) from application to IdP
- ↳ Verify strength of encryption algorithm
- ↳ Have strong AD / window permissions
- ↳ Have proper NTP to prevent replay attacks.
- ↳ Sign SAML token for authentication & decompilation
- ↳ verify expiry & validity of certificates.
- ↳ Logout browser session + proper session mgmt.
- ↳ XML security

# LDAP

→ LDAP is part of AD - LDAP is protocol that allows users to query AD and authenticate access to it.

Light weight Directory Access Protocol

Microsoft AD is LDAP Based like Telephone Directory.

LDAP is centralized Access control system + supports SSO.

PKI uses LDAP when integrating digital certificates into transmissions. LDAP is the protocol when client query CA for certificate info.

Note - simple Authentication & Security layer (SASL) is secure ~~an~~ Authentication mode for LDAP.

→ when we login to AD / Domain controller (DC) which has hierarchical LDAP directory in the database. This database organize network resource & carries out user access control functionality. Upon successful authentication to DC, certain network resources are available (printer, email, file server)

LDAP / open LDAP

is not secure - port 389 - stores user password in clear / unencrypted

LDAP over SSL (LDAPS)

secure - port 636 - secure connection over SSL / TLS

Global Catalog Services

uses port 3268 & 3269